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I. INTRODUCTION
In attempting to understand the relationship between law and
the larger society of which it is a part, it is useful to distinguish be-
tween laws used to enforce traditional social norms and laws enacted
to displace or transform them. Laws function quite differently, and
threats to their effective mobilization and enforcement vary signifi-
cantly, in each of these socio-legal contexts.
Modern Indian legal history provides numerous examples of the
formal displacement of traditional norms by new legal rules. Indeed,
as Marc Galanter has observed,1 modern Indian legal history pro-
vides a salient example of the broad based formal displacement of an
entire indigenous legal order by what he refers to as modern law.
However as Galanter also notes, in the Indian context as in
others one must not confuse formal displacement with actual trans-
formation. Even after modern law has displaced traditional norms
within a formal legal system, the traditional norms persist in the
larger society, and stand poised to "interpret, adjust, take over, ma-
nipulate, change, and/or possess the new modern system."2
It may be useful then to distinguish between three categories or
classes of law: law which corresponds to and seeks to enforce tradi-
tional norms; law which seeks to displace or transform traditional
norms; and law which, although originally intended to displace tradi-
tional norms, has been coopted in the manner Galanter describes.
For ease of description, we might refer to these three categories re-
spectively as "normal law," "transformative law," and "captured law."
Instances of transformative law, that is, instances in which
traditional norms have been at least formally supplanted by new
legal rules, can be expected to emerge in a variety of socio-political
* LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER is an Acting Professor of Law at the University of
California at Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall). B.A. Stanford University, 1975;
J.D. New York University, 1978.
1. Marc Galanter, Law and Society in Modern India (1989).
2. Id. at 15.
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contexts. First, as occurred in nineteenth century India, transforma-
tive law may emerge from colonial conditions. In this context, the
colonizing society, often with the help of indigenous collaborators, im-
poses laws and/or legal procedures expressing norms congenial to the
colonizers but remote from the indigenous culture.
Transformative law can also emerge from federal political ar-
rangements, in which majoritarian social norms differ in the various
constituent states. In these situations, federal law may express
norms congenial to a majority of the constituent states, but inconsis-
tent with traditional norms in one or more of them. Although the
federal majority tends not to see it this way, federal law in this con-
text functions much like colonial law, formally displacing traditional
local norms, which persist outside of the formal legal field and resist
or seek to coopt it.
Finally, transformative law can emerge from any intellectually,
culturally, or politically pluralistic society, in which, through judi-
cial, executive, or legislative action, a distinct class or interest group
succeeds in enacting reformist laws aimed at displacing popular
norms which that class or interest group perceives as unjust. Civil
rights laws and laws designed otherwise to assist or uplift tradition-
ally subordinated groups often emerge in this way, as one among
many species of transformative law.
As earlier noted, the formal displacement of traditional norms by
new legal rules does not guarantee their de facto displacement in the
relevant socio-legal environment. Through a variety of mechanisms,
traditional norms resist displacement by the new legal rules.
Consider, for example, the threats posed by traditional norma-
tive systems to the effective enforcement of transformative laws
designed to protect or uplift historically subordinated groups. In the
case of criminal laws, or civil laws as to which there exists no private
right of action, law enforcement officials, whose personal loyalties fre-
quently lie with the traditional normative system, may be unwilling
to enforce the new legal rules at the expense of traditional norms.
Where a victim complaint is required to initiate formal legal proceed-
ings, social pressures, expressed as either subtle or blatant social
boycotts or reprisals, may make resort to the new legal protections by
their intended beneficiaries too costly. Similar social pressures may
constrain the willingness of witnesses to cooperate with the new legal
order, resulting in the suppression of evidence needed to make suc-
cessful enforcement even remotely possible.
Judges, whose conscious or unconscious allegiance often lies with
traditional rather than transformative legal norms, may also con-
strain the new law's effective implementation. Administrative offi-
cials functioning in a quasi-judicial capacity, along with both trial
and appellate level judges, can exploit loopholes or ambiguities in the
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law, thereby systematically limiting its practical sphere of applica-
tion. Or, as legal sociologist Lauren Edelman has described, 3 tradi-
tional norms may so thoroughly influence the elaboration and
interpretation of the new legal rules that those new legal norms actu-
ally end up providing a vehicle for the reassertion and relegitimation
of the traditional normative regime. In this way, transformative law
becomes captured law.
The operation of subtle cognitive and motivational biases which
distort social perception and judgment may further constrain the im-
plementation of transformative law. The mechanisms by which so-
cial stereotypes, social group allegiances, and subjective conceptions
of justice or fairness bias the evaluation of evidence in civil and crimi-
nal adjudication are well-documented in the social psychological liter-
ature.4 Either deliberately, or as a consequence of unconscious biases
in the evaluation of ambiguous information, lay jurors or judges act-
ing as fact-finders may be reluctant to draw the inferences required
to support a finding of guilt or civil liability under the new legal rules.
Finally, and often in combination with the above-described phe-
nomena, implementation of transformative law may be constrained
by resource imbalances between prosecution and defense. In the con-
text of "normal" criminal law, where prosecutors act to enforce domi-
nant social norms, they are likely to occupy positions of greater power
and to possess greater resources than the strata of defendants they
prosecute. However, where transformative law challenges or seeks to
displace traditional norms, the opposite condition will often obtain.
At least in the civil rights context, transformative law is most fre-
quently mobilized by social "outsiders" against social "insiders." As a
general rule, social insiders have greater access to legal resources
than do social outsiders. Thus, where transformative laws are crimi-
nal rather than civil in nature, state actors frequently find them-
selves prosecuting individuals who occupy a significantly higher
economic and social station and command far greater popular sup-
port than characterizes the strata of defendants most commonly pros-
ecuted for violations of normal law. These relatively well-resourced
defendants are better able than their normal law counterparts to ex-
ploit the law's soft-spots, and thereby restrict its application, either to
them individually, or more broadly as a function of judicial precedent.
There are then, I would argue, significant differences between
normal and transformative law. They serve fundamentally different
3. Edelman, Lande, & Erlanger, "Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transforma-
tion of Civil Rights in the Workplace," 27 Law and Society Review 497 (1992).
4. For a review of these literatures, see, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Robert J.
Boeckmann, Heather J. Smith & Yuen J. Huo, Social Justice in a Diverse Society 53-
54 (1997); Armour, "Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice Habit," 83 Cal. L. Rev. 733 (1995); Moore, "Trial by Schema: Cognitive
Filters in the Courtroom," 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 273 (1989).
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social purposes and are subject to different forms of abuse. Sources of
threat to their effective enforcement can be expected to vary consider-
ably, in both nature and degree. Evidentiary or procedural rules
which perform defined policy functions in the context of one may
work profoundly different results in the other. Correspondingly, the
absence of a particular process protection may occasion little diffi-
culty in one context, while resulting in profoundly negative conse-
quences in the other. In short, procedural and evidentiary devices
designed with normal law in mind may function quite differently
where transformative law is concerned.
My purpose here is to examine two such procedural/evidentiary
devices - the burden of proof, and its close relative, the evidentiary
presumption - and to compare how these function in one American
and three Indian civil rights statutes. On the Indian side, I explore
the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955,5 the Dowry Prohibition
(Amendment) Act, 1986, and the Criminal Law (Second Amendment)
Act of 1983. I compare these, and in particular, their allocation of
burdens of proof, with the quite different allocation regime contained
in the most frequently mobilized U.S. civil rights statute, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
All of these statutes, at least when first enacted, could fairly be
described as instances of transformative law. All represent federal
law, imposed on at least some states which, at the time the laws were
enacted, would not have enacted them themselves. All were champi-
oned by a coalition of socio-cultural groups within the larger society
in an effort to displace deeply entrenched traditional norms which
those responsible for the laws' passage found objectionable on moral
and philosophical grounds. Through all of the mechanisms described
above, both sets of laws have been resisted by at least significant por-
tions of the communities on which they were imposed.
One salient difference between these two sets of laws provides
the subject for our present inquiry. As will be described in more de-
tail below, all three of the Indian statutes I examine, like many other
instances of transformative Indian law, attempt to use presumptions
and burdens of proof as a tool for countering the traditional norma-
tive system's resistance to the implementation of the new legal re-
gime. As it has been interpreted by American courts, Title VII does
not.
My present inquiry centers on the following questions. What can
we learn about the role of burdens of proof and presumptions in
transformative legal regimes by comparing how these are allocated
5. Enacted in 1955, the Act was originally entitled "The Untouchability (Of-
fences) Act of 1955." It was amended in 1976 by the Untouchability (Offences)
Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, at which time its title was changed to
the Protection of Civil Rights Act.
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and defined in Indian and American civil rights law? How can the
Indian experience inform American law, and in particular, current
controversies over the proper allocation of burdens of proof in certain
categories of civil rights cases? How might the American experience
alert the Indian legal community to the questions and conflicts that
likely lie ahead, as its civil rights laws develop and come to be more
frequently and effectively mobilized by beneficiary groups? And,
more broadly, how closely does existing thought about the policy
functions served by burdens of proof and presumptions map onto the
comparative Indian/American civil rights experience?
II. BURDENS OF PROOF AND PREsuMPTIONS IN
TRANSFORMATIVE INDIAN LAW
A. The Protection of Civil Rights Act
The institution of Untouchability is rooted in Hindu culture and
religion. It derives from the systems of varnas, or castes, into which
Indian society was theoretically divided in traditional Hindu law. 6
Three of the four varnas, the Brahmin, the Kshatriya, and the
Vaishya, command the highest ritual standing. Members of these
three varnas, by virtue of their investment with the "sacred thread,"
were regarded as "twice born." The fourth varna, the Shudra, was
considered socially inferior to the other three. Persons falling outside
of these four groups, or in some regions, persons in or at the bottom of
the Shudra caste, were considered ritually impure and were subject
to severe social and political disabilities. Individuals falling into
these categories and treated in this manner came to be known as
"Untouchables."
While the disabilities enforced against so-called Untouchables,
and the precise composition of the groups on which they were im-
posed, varied from region to region, those disabilities tended to in-
clude: denial of access to public facilities such as wells, bathing
facilities, schools, roads, post offices, and courts; denial of access to
temples and other sacred places, including places of religious learn-
ing; exclusion from large classes of employment and educational op-
portunities; segregation into the most menial, dirty occupations;
residential segregation; and denial of access to private shops and
services.
6. Throughout this short treatment of Untouchability in Indian society, I will
spare the reader detailed footnotes. References used in constructing this overview
include S.K. Aswathi, The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 (1992); Marc Galanter, Law and Society in Modern India (1989);
Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India
(1984); J. Michael Mahar, (ed.), The Untouchables in Contemporary India (1972); and
M. N. Srinivas, Caste in Modern India and Other Essays (1966).
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During the period of colonial rule, the British made no active ef-
fort to eliminate the caste system, although the establishment of a
colonial legal order which failed to institutionalize caste distinctions
necessarily destabilized them to some extent. In the absence of offi-
cial government action to enforce caste distinctions, private actors
systematically engaged in "self-help," in the form of boycotts and re-
prisals, to enforce traditional caste disabilities.
Untouchability came under intense indigenous attack during the
Indian Independence Movement. Mohandas Gandhi vigorously de-
cried the injustice worked by the institution of Untouchability, and
called for a purified varnashrama dharma, in which the Untouch-
ables would be reabsorbed into the Shudra. Bimrao Amedkar, an
Untouchable himself and the architect of what would become the In-
dian Constitution, advocated the abolition of the varna system in its
entirety.
After Independence, the institution of Untouchability was for-
mally eliminated by the Indian Constitution of 1950. Although nu-
merous provisions are implicated in its disestablishment, the most
directly applicable is found in Article 17, which provides:
"Untouchability" is abolished and its practice in any form is
forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of
"Untouchability" shall be an offence punishable in accord-
ance with law.
This provision, like other anti-discrimination provisions of the Indian
Constitution, prohibits the enforcement of civil disabilities not only
by the state, but by private actors as well.
This Constitutional prohibition was soon reinforced by the Un-
touchability (Offences) Act (UOA) of 1955. The Act as -originally
passed prohibited the imposition of disabilities on the ground of Un-
touchability in the provision of professional or commercial services,
the right to practice a particular trade or occupation, or to use partic-
ular utensils, or in access to public accommodations, water, re-
sources, charitable benefits, hospital or other health services,
educational opportunities, housing, or places of worship. Discrimina-
tion in employment was added as a prohibited practice by amend-
ment in 1976. 7 Untouchability, although not actually defined in the
Act, is generally interpreted as referring either to membership in a
Scheduled Caste, as defined in Clause 24 of Article 366 of the Indian
Constitution, or membership in any other group which by local cus-
tom or usage is regarded as "Untouchable."
The Untouchability (Offences) Act, renamed the Protection of
Civil Rights Act by the 1976 amendments, is a criminal statute. Pen-
7. The Untouchability (Offences) Amendment and Miscellaneous Provision Act,
1976 (No. 106 of 1976), Anand Mohan Suri, (ed.), The Current Indian Statutes, 1955
(January - December), 836-44.
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alties for its violation include imprisonment for a term of one to six
months; fines between one hundred and five hundred rupees, the can-
cellation or suspension of professional or trade licensing, and/or the
suspension or revocation of government funding grants.
That aspect of the Act most relevant to our present inquiry is
found in Sections 12, which provides:
Presumption by courts in certain cases. - Where any act
constituting and offence under this Act is committed in rela-
tion to a member of a Scheduled Caste as defined in clause
(24) of article 366 of the Constitution, the court shall pre-
sume, unless the contrary is proved, that such act was com-
mitted on the ground of "untouchability."
Thus, under Section 12, once the prosecution succeeds in proving that
an act which, assuming requisite culpable intent, would constitute an
offence when committed in relation to a member of a scheduled caste,
the court is obliged to presume, until the contrary is proven by the
defendant, that the act was committed on the ground of
untouchability.
That the phrase "shall presume" signals a shift of the burden of
persuasion on the issue of "grounds" to the defendant, and not merely
a burden of coming forward with evidence, becomes clear by reference
to the definition of that phrase in Section 4 of the Indian Evidence
Act and to its interpretation by the Indian Supreme Court. Section 4
of the Indian Evidence Act provides, in relevant part:
S. 4. "MAY PRESUME". - Whenever it is provided by this
[Act] that the Court may presume a fact, it may either
regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is dis-
proved, or may call for proof of it:
"SHALL PRESUME". - Whenever it is directed by this
[Act] that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall re-
gard such fact as proved, unless and until it is
disproved...
Presumptions of the first type are referred to as "presumptions of
fact," those of the second, "presumptions of law."8
Under Indian law, these two types of presumptions have dis-
tinctly different effects. As the Indian Supreme Court noted in Syad
Akbar v. State of Karnataka, "presumptions of fact merely affect the
burden of going forward with the evidence. Presumptions of law,
8. M.C. Sarkar, S.C. Sarkar, & Proabhas C. Sarkar, 1 Sarkar's Law of Evidence
66 (13 ' ed. 1993), While the definitions of "may presume" and "shall presume" con-
tained in Section 4 refer to the use of those terms in the Indian Evidence Act, the
terms are accorded the same meaning elsewhere in Indian law, including in the Pro-
tection of Civil Rights Act. See, S. K. Awasthi, The Scheduled Castes and the Sched-
uled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, 320 (1992 ed.), (defining the terms
"shall presume" as used in Section 12 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act as it is
defined in Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act).
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however, go so far as to shift the legal burden of persuasion so that, in
the absence of evidence sufficient to rebut it on a balance of
probability, a verdict must be directed."9
In the language of American evidence law, the Indian presump-
tion of fact functions somewhat like a Thayer "bursting bubble" pre-
sumption, as institutionalized by Federal Rule of Evidence 301. A
presumption of fact, like a Rule 301 presumption, merely shifts the
burden of producing evidence to the party against whom the pre-
sumption is raised. Assuming that evidence is produced, the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion on the issue remains with the party upon
whom it was originally placed. An Indian presumption of law, on the
other hand, functions more like an American "Morgan presumption,"
shifting the burden of persuasion on the relevant element of liability,
not only the burden of producing evidence, to the party against whom
the presumption has been raised.10 Accordingly, in a case brought
under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, once the prosecution has
demonstrated that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled
Caste, and that conduct specified in the Act was directed at such
member of a Scheduled Caste, the burden of persuasion shifts to the
defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the con-
duct was not taken "on the grounds of untouchability.""
B. The Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act and the Criminal Law
(Second Amendment) Act
The common misconception that the practice of dowry is deeply
rooted in Hindu law stems from a confusion between the practice of
dowry and the traditional gifting practices of varadakshina and
stridhan. Under traditional Hindu law, an approved marriage be-
tween two Hindus was considered a kanyadan.12 The Dharmashas-
tra provided that the act of kanyadan was not complete until the
bridegroom was given a dakshina, or gift, from the bride's father.
Gifts were given to the bride as well, and these, referred to as
stridhan, became her separate property to own and dispense with
during marriage as she saw fit.13
9. AIR 1979 S.C. 1848 (1979 Cri. L. J. 1374).
10. For a discussion of the Morgan/Thayer debate and its resolution in Federal
Rule of Evidence 301, see Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal
Practice and Procedure: Evidence, Vol. 21, §5122, 552-73.
11. See generally, S. K. Aswathi, supra n. 8, at 320. Offenses charged under Sec-
tion 7 of the P.O.C.R.A., involving the offering of "insult" to a member of a Scheduled
Caste, appear to be analyzed somewhat differently. At least one court has held that,
in "insult" cases, before the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant the prosecu-
tion must also prove that the insult was "of a species" that had a "nexus" with un-
touchability. Laxman Jayaram v. State of Maharashtra, 1981 Cr L J 387 (Bombay).
12. Kanyadan is best translated into English as a kind of "sacrament," although
the Hebrew word mitzvah probably captures its meaning more closely.
13. See, Report of the Joint Committee of the Houses to Examine the Question of
the Working of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, in Paras Diwan & Peeyushi Diwan,
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The precise circumstances bridging between these traditions and
the modern practice of dowry are contested and unclear. 14 However
the transition occurred, by the nineteenth century, the gifts previ-
ously associated with the marriage ceremony had lost their voluntary
character and become obligatory on the bride's family.
During the twentieth century, the practice of dowry spread into
geographical areas and religious communities where it had not previ-
ously been practiced. As the practice spread and intensified, hus-
bands' families, who possessed greater bargaining power in relation
to dowry for a variety of reasons, demanded increasingly large sums.
Over time, a variety of extortionist tactics developed by which hus-
bands' families extracted additional dowry during the course of the
marriage. Perceptions that the bride's family had provided insuffi-
cient dowry, or failures of the bride's family to accede to repeated
dowry requests, often led to harassment, physical violence, ejection
from the husband's house, and even death - often by burning, or by
"assisted suicide" - of the hapless, isolated wife. 15
Perceptions that the practice of dowry had become a social evil of
dramatic severity and scale led to the enactment by the Indian Par-
liament of the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961. The Act represented
the first national effort to prohibit the practice of dowry but was
flawed in a number of significant respects. As a consequence, it
proved relatively ineffective in either suppressing the practice of
dowry, lessening the incidence of dowry-related violence, or providing
a vehicle for the successful prosecution of dowry-demand or dowry
violence-related offenses. 1
6
Perhaps the most shocking of the social ills associated with the
practice of dowry was a phenomenon that came to be known as "bride
burning" or "dowry death." During the 1960's and 1970's, India ex-
perienced a dramatic increase in the number of incidents in which a
married woman died in highly suspicious circumstances, but in which
homicide could not be proved. Typically in these cases, the victim
was a young woman, recently married, whose family had prior to her
death been harassed by repeated demands for dowry. Frequently
death was by suicide, or by burning, which the husband's family gen-
erally attributed to an accidental kitchen fire. Whether by staged
"accident" or by suicide, the victim often died after months or years of
Dowry and Protection to Married Women, Appendix IV (3' ed. 1995); Jethmalani &
Dey, "Dowry Deaths and Access to Justice," in Rani Jethmalani, (ed.), Kali's Yug:
Empowerment, Law and Dowry Death 38-39 (1995).
14. For one historical explanation, see, Anshu Nangia, "The Tragedy of Bride
Burning In India: How Should the Law Address It?," 22 Brook. J. Int'l L. 637, 641-43
(1997).
15. Report of the Joint Committee, supra n. 13, at 326-29; Nangia, id. at 644-46.
16. For a detailed discussion of the inadequacies of the Dowry Prohibition Act of
1961, see, Report of the Joint Committee, supra n. 13, at 330-39; Diwan & Diwan,
supra n. 13, at 21.
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physical and psychological cruelty, inflicted by her husband or mem-
bers of the husband's family with whom the victim had lived, often in
total social isolation from outsiders, including members of her own
natal family. By the late 1970's, this phenomenon, now the subject of
a high-profile social crusade by Indian feminists, came to be known
as "dowry death," or "bride burning.'
7
For a variety of reasons, Indian law proved inadequate to reckon
with dowry-related violence. As of the early 1980's, India had no sys-
tematic legal framework for dealing with the problem of domestic
abuse. And while the Indian Penal Code did criminalize homicide'
8
and abetment of suicide, 19 prosecutions under these provisions in
dowry death cases were, for a variety of reasons, rarely successful.
Prosecutors in these cases were generally able to prove the cause
of death, and the fact that within a certain period of time before the
victim's death, her family had been subject to one or more demands
for dowry. But prosecutors were almost never able to prove that the
death resulted from homicide rather than from accident, or by abet-
ted suicide rather than by simple suicide, because the acts resulting
in death almost always occurred within the husband's house, out of
view of all but the husband and his family, who were often complicit
in the crime and, in any event, virtually never provided testimony
against their kin.
20
Between 1983 and 1986, the Indian Parliament responded with a
series of new laws designed to strengthen prosecutors' hand in re-
sponding to dowry-related offenses, including dowry deaths. Two of
these, the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act and the Criminal
Law (Second Amendment) Act, are relevant to our present inquiry.
The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act of 1983, codified in
part as Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, establishes criminal
penalties for the infliction of physical or mental "cruelty" inflicted on
a wife by her husband or in-laws. The statute provides in relevant
part:
SECTION 498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty: Whoever, being the husband or the
relative of the husband of a woman subjects such woman to
cruelty, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to
fine.
Explanation - For the purpose of this section, "cruelty"
means -
17. Vijayrao Mohite & Vandana Chavan, Law of Cruelty, Abetment of Suicide and
Dowry Deaths 226-27 (1993); D. N. Sandanshiv & Jolly Mathew, "Legal Reform in
Dowry Laws," in Rani Jethmalani, Kali's Yug, supra n. 13, at 80-81.
18. Indian Penal Code Section 302.
19. Indian Penal Code Section 306.
20. V. Mohite & V. Chavan, supra n. 17, at 201-02, 226-27.
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(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental
or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her
to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valua-
ble security, or is on account of failure by her or any per-
son related to her to meet such demand.
21
Under Section 498-A, subsection (b), harassment of a woman in con-
nection with the making of demands for dowry is defined as a form of
cruelty, chargeable under the statute. The definition set forth in sub-
section (a) is unrelated to dowry demands. Accordingly, violations of
Section 498-A sometimes do and sometimes do not constitute dowry-
related offenses.
The 1983 law also included provisions designed to strengthen
prosecutors' hand in dealing with abetment of suicide cases related
both to the practice of dowry and to other forms of domestic abuse.
Specifically, the statute added a new Section 113-A to the Indian Evi-
dence Act of 1862. That section, which will be discussed in greater
detail below, provides:
S. 113-A. PRESUMPTION AS TO ABETMENT OF SUICIDE BY A
MARRIED WOMAN. - When the question is whether the com-
mission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her hus-
band or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she
had committed suicide within a period of seven years from
the date of her marriage and that her husband or such rela-
tive of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court
may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances
of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her hus-
band or by such relative of her husband. 22
Although the precise operation of the presumption established by
Section 113-A remains unclear, at a minimum it permits a court to
infer from the facts of suicide during the first seven years of marriage
and the infliction of cruelty upon the wife by her husband or in-laws,
that the suicide was abetted by the husband, or by a member of his
family, within the meaning of Indian Penal Code Section 306. As we
will shortly see however, it does not necessarily operate to shift the
burden of persuasion.
21. The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 46 of 1983), V.
Mohite & V. Chavan, supra n. 17, at 74.
22. M. C. Sarkar, S. C. Sarkar, & Prabhas C. Sarkar, 2 Sarkar's Law of Evidence
( 1 3 th ed., 1993) at 1501.
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Three years later, the Indian Parliament passed the Dowry Pro-
hibition (Amendment) Act of 1986. Two provisions of this Act are
also relevant to our present inquiry.
First, the Act amended the Indian Penal Code, adding a new Sec-
tion 304-B, which established and defined the new crime of dowry
death. That section provides, in relevant part:
S. 304-B. DOWRY DEATH. - (1) Where the death of a woman
is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven years of her
marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
relative of her husband, for, or in connection with any de-
mand for dowry, such shall be called "dowry death," and
such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her
death.
Simultaneously, Parliament amended the Indian Evidence Act,
adding a new section 113-B, which established certain presumptions,
and thereby allocated burdens of persuasion in prosecutions under
Section 304-B. Section 113-B provides:
S. 113-B. PRESUMPTIONS AS TO DOWRY DEATH. - When the
question is whether a person has committed the dowry death
of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such
woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or har-
assment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,
the Court shall presume that such person had caused the
dowry death.2
3
Under these two statutes, burdens of proof in dowry death prose-
cutions are allocated in the following way. First, the prosecution
bears the burden of proving: (1) the death; (2) by burns, bodily injury,
or other unnatural causes; (3) of a woman during her first seven
years of marriage; and (4) the subjection of the woman to cruelty or
harassment for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry; (5) soon
before her death.24 Once these elements are proven by the prosecu-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt, a legal presumption is raised, and
the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to prove, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that he or she did not cause the victim's
death. 25 Thus, under this statute, as under the Protection of Civil
Rights Act, once the prosecution has established certain facts predi-
cate, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to establish
23. Id., n. 20 at 1501.
24. Obviously, the precise meaning of the various essential elements of the crime
of dowry death, such as the meaning of "unnatural causes" or "soon before her death,"
are ambiguous and therefore subject to judicial interpretation. However, an explora-
tion of how Indian courts have interpreted these concepts is beyond the scope of my
present investigation.
25. V. Mohite & V. Chavan, supra n. 17, at 197.
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that one of the essential elements of the crime is missing. In dowry
death prosecutions, that element is causation in fact; in prosecutions
under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, it is intent to discriminate
on the grounds of untouchability.
Dowry-related suicides may be prosecuted either as abetment of
suicide, under I.P.C. Section 306, or as dowry deaths, under Section
304-B. 26 If prosecuted under the former statute, the presumption of
fact established by Indian Evidence Act (I.E.A.) Section 113-A will
apply. If prosecuted under the latter, the presumption of law under
Section 113-B will attach, and along with it, an automatic shift to the
defendant of the burden of persuasion on the issue of causation.
In attempting to understand the relationship between presump-
tions and burdens of proof in these statutes and under Indian law
more generally, it is instructive to compare Sections 113-A and 113-
B. As indicated above, Section 113-A provides that, upon the estab-
lishment of certain facts by the state in an abetment of suicide prose-
cution, a court may presume that the defendant abetted the victim's
suicide. Thus, in a prosecution for abetment of suicide under Indian
Penal Code Section 306, once the prosecution establishes that the sui-
cide occurred during the first seven years of marriage and that, prior
to her suicide, the victim's husband or his relatives had subjected her
to cruelty within the meaning of I.P.C Section 498-A, a presumption
of some sort is raised. But precisely what kind of presumption is it?
The use of the phrase "may presume" in section 113-A signifies
the presence of a Section 4 presumption of fact. As one influential
commentary describes the matter, presumptions of this kind reflect
"those natural inferences which the 'common course of natural
events,' human conduct, and public and private business suggest to
us."27 Once a presumption of fact is raised, a court may on that basis
alone regard the fact as proved, or may call for further proof of it. ''28
In this respect, it is "permissive, optional and discretionary."29
Presumptions of fact, reflecting the assumed "common course of
natural events," are quite common in Indian law. Under Section 114
of the Indian Evidence Code, for example, a court may presume that
a person in possession of stolen goods soon after their theft is either
the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen. A
court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced
would, if produced, be unfavorable to the person who withholds it, or
26. Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh High Court v. T. Punniah, 1989 Crl. L. J.
2330. See generally, Kali's Jug, supra n. 13, at 85 (Dowry-related suicide chargeable
under I.P.C. Section 304-B as dowry death).
27. M.C. Sarkar, S. C. Sarkar, & Prabhas C. Sarkar, 1 Sarkar's Law of Evidence,
supra n. 8, at 67.
28. Indian Evidence Act, Section 4; V. Mohite & V. Chavan, supra n. 17, at 192.
29. Id.
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that the common course of business had been followed in a particular
case. 3
0
Although one might reasonably assume from these examples
that the presumption of fact operates in the same way as an inference
operates under American law, this is not in fact the case. The distinc-
tion is explained as follows: "A presumption and an inference are not
the same thing. A 'presumption' is a deduction which the law re-
quires a trier to make; an 'inference' is a deduction which the trier of
fact may or may not make according to his own conclusions. A pre-
sumption is mandatory; an inference is permissible." 3
1
Thus, a presumption of fact requires a court, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, to draw the conclusion specified in the stat-
ute. But, if evidence to the contrary is presented, the presumption
does not compel a particular result. It is permissive in this respect.
The function served by the presumption of fact is this: it compels a
party who might otherwise remain silent to speak. If the party
against whom the presumption is raised wishes not to have the point
decided against him, he must come forward with evidence. He must
take a stand. He must participate in the sharpening of the factual
issue for the court's decision.
Important as this might be, it is quite different than the pre-
sumption contained in Section 113-B, applied in cases charged under
the Dowry Death Act. Under the language of that section, once the
prosecution has established the relevant facts predicate, the court
"SHALL PRESUME" that the defendant had caused the victim's dowry
death." Unlike the presumption contained in Section 113-A, this is a
presumption of law. Under the terms of Indian Evidence Act Section
4, the fact presumed must be regarded as proved, unless and until it
is disproved.
Thus, presumptions of fact and presumptions of law have com-
pletely different effects on the allocation of burdens of proof. The Sec-
tion 113-A presumption merely shifts the burden of going forward
with evidence to the party against whom it is raised. The Section
113-B presumption, on the other hand, shifts the burden of persua-
sion.32 As we will later see, these two types of presumptions have
very different purposes and effects, and represent fundamentally dif-
ferent judgments about the proper balance to strike between compet-
ing policy concerns.
30. See generally, M.C. Sarkar et al., 2 Sarkar's Law of Evidence, supra n. 22,
1502-04.
31. Id. at 1509.
32. Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 S.C. 1848 (1979 Cri. L. J. 1374).
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C. Placing the Statutes in Context: General Principles Governing
Burdens of Proof at Common Law
The burden allocation provisions contained in the Protection of
Civil Rights Act and the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act repre-
sent dramatic departures from the ordinary principles governing bur-
dens of proof under Indian law in particular, and under the common
law more generally. In Indian law as in American, the burden of per-
suasion as to any particular fact generally rests on the party who
wishes the Court to believe in the fact's existence.3 3 As provided in
I.E.A. §101, "[w]hoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any
legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he
asserts, must prove that those facts exist."34 Indeed, one of the illus-
trations given in §101 states: "A desires a Court to give judgment
that B shall be punished for a crime which A says B has committed.
A must prove that B has committed the crime." 35 No one would seri-
ously dispute that in an action for homicide, one of the essential ele-
ments of the crime is that the accused caused the victim's death.
Similarly, in an action to redress discrimination of the kind prohib-
ited by the Protection of Civil Rights Act, no one would quarrel with
the proposition that one essential element of the prosecution's case
would ordinarily be that the victim's group status motivated the de-
fendant's negative action against him.
Interestingly, one can point to a number of examples of trans-
formative Indian law in which ordinary burden allocation principles
have been overridden. So for example, in prosecutions for taking or
demanding dowry under Sections 3 or 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act
of 1961, the defendant bears the burden of proving that he or she has
NOT committed an offense under the Act.
36
A second example is found in the Criminal Law (Amendment)
Act of 1983, which amended India's criminal rape statute, Indian Pe-
nal Code §376, and added a new §114-A to the Indian Evidence Act.
While in ordinary rape prosecutions the burden of proving absence of
consent rests on the state, the new Indian Penal Code (I. P. C.) Sec-
tion 376(2), combined with the new I. E. A. §114-A provides a number
of exceptions to this rule in cases where there exists an obvious power
imbalance between the victim and the accused. Specifically, where
the defendant in a rape prosecution is a police officer, a public ser-
vant, a manager of a jail, remand home, or hospital, or where the
victim is pregnant at the time sexual intercourse occurs, the burden
33. Indian Evidence Act, §103.
34. Indian Evidence Act, §101. See generally, A.N. Saha, Law of Evidence 437-40
(1991).
35. Id.
36. This provision, codified as Section 8A of the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961,
was added to the statute through the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act of 1986,
1986 A.I.R. 73 (Nag.) 189-90.
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of proving consent is placed on him, assuming of course that the pros-
ecution is able to prove that intercourse occurred.37
A third example is found in the Protection of Civil Rights Act.
Under §14 of the Act, where a company is charged with committing
an offense, including discrimination in employment against a mem-
ber of a Scheduled Caste, any management employee of the company
may be individually charged with violating the Act and, if charged,
bears the burden of proving that the offense was committed without
his knowledge or that he did everything reasonably possible to pre-
vent the offense from being committed.38
In each of these instances, as under the Dowry Death Act or the
Protection of Civil Rights Act, deviation from normal burden alloca-
tion principles is justified by Indian legal commentators on one or
more of the following grounds. With respect to the Dowry Death Act,
placing the burden of proof on the defendant is justified by the severe
difficulties faced by prosecutors in adducing evidence of guilt. Be-
cause the crimes targeted by the Act generally occur in the privacy of
the husband's home, and because family members are so frequently
involved in the crime or unwilling to testify against their kin, placing
the burden of proof on the prosecution rendered previous criminal
statutes virtually useless in reckoning with dowry-related homicides.
Given the practical realities of proof, a guilty family's silence under
the previous regime virtually ensured its immunity to successful
prosecution. As one leading Indian commentary observes in explain-
ing the burden allocation provisions contained in the Dowry Death
Act, "It is to meet cases where the proof of particular facts is not prov-
able or easily provable that such presumptions are usually en-
acted."39 The presumption of law imposed on the defendant forces
37. I. E. A. §114-A provides:
114-A. PRESUMPTION AS TO ABSENCE OF CONSENT IN CERTAIN PROSECU-
TIONS FOR RAPE. - In prosecutions for rape under clause (a) or clause (b) or
clause (c) or clause (e) or clause (g) of subsection (2) of Section 376 of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where sexual intercourse by the accused is
proved and the questions is whether it was with or without the consent of the
woman alleged to have been raped and she states in her evidence before the
Court that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not
consent.
38. Section 14 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Untoucha-
bility (Offences) Amendment and Miscellaneous Provision Act, 1976 (No. 106 of 1976),
provides in relevant part:
14. OFFENCES BY COMPANIES. - (1) If the person committing an offence
under this Act is a company, every person who at the time the offence was
committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the
conduct of the business of the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the
offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any
such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that the offence was com-
mitted without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to pre-
vent the commission of such offence.
39. V. Mohite & V. Chavan, supra n. 17, at 197.
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the family to speak, to participate through the production of evidence
as an active contributor to the court's search for truth.
Of course, this purpose could also be served by a presumption of
fact. As we have seen, presumptions of fact operate precisely in this
way: to force the party against whom the presumption is raised to
speak. The use of a presumption of law then, as opposed to a mere
presumption of fact, suggests the presence of additional policy inter-
ests at stake in the relevant burden allocation decision.
The first of these policy interests is implicated in virtually all of
the statutes described above. Placing the burden of proof on a crimi-
nal defendant signals a legislative judgment as to the severity of the
problem being targeted by the statute and the urgency of the need for
radical social change. Placing the burden of proof as to consent on
the defendant in a rape prosecution, or the burden of proof as to cau-
sation in an employment discrimination prosecution, or the burden of
proof on the family in a case alleging the demanding or taking of a
dowry, sends a clear symbolic message that the state means business.
Whatever their practical impact on the outcome of prosecutions, bur-
den of proof allocations have substantial symbolic and rhetorical
value in law enforcement and related social justice discourse.
40
One aspect of this symbolic and rhetorical significance concerns
the manner in which burden allocation decisions reflect implicit judi-
cial or legislative judgments about "the common nature of things," or,
more technically stated, about the prior probabilities associated with
various classes of events. As various American commentators have
described, the risk of non-persuasion is frequently placed upon the
party seeking to establish the least likely scenario. 41 This general
principle is supported by two obvious policies. First, allocating the
risk of non-persuasion to the party seeking to establish the least-
likely scenario minimizes the risk of producing an erroneous result.
Requiring the party attempting, as McCormick put it, to "establish
the improbable" accordingly seems more fair than assigning the risk
of non-persuasion to his opponent, who as a matter of presumed base
rate probabilities is prima facie more likely innocent than not.
Understood in this way, the rhetorical and political significance
of burden allocation decisions becomes clear. An implicit judicial or
legislative statement, reflected in a burden allocation rule, that neg-
ative action taken against a member of a subordinated social group is
"more likely than not" attributable to some form of social oppression
is profoundly political. Such a rule says much more than simply how
40. For an American commentary on the symbolic and rhetorical functions of bur-
dens of proof, see, Richard H. Gaskins, Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse (1992).
41. See, e.g., McCormick on Evidence §337, at 950 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed.
1984);. Cleary, "Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity," 12 Stan.
L. Rev. 5, 13-14 (1959). See also, Hay, "Allocating the Burden of Proof," 72 Ind. L. J.
651, 663 (examining the issue from a law and economics perspective).
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the evidence in any particular case should be evaluated. It implicitly
validates the political claim that social injustice of the kind ad-
dressed by the relevant statute is still part of "the common nature of
things" and continues to require resolute remedial action. Con-
versely, placing the burden of proof on the individual member of the
subordinated group implicitly states, "Whatever your problem might
be, it is not likely attributable to social injustice of the type addressed
by the law you attempt to invoke." Such a statement carries the im-
plicit assertion that the oppressive conduct targeted by the statute is
rare, and thus an unlikely explanation for the beneficiary group's
continuing social, political, or economic misfortune. In this way as in
others, burden allocation decisions express implicit judgments about
the way things work in the world, and, accordingly, rhetorically ad-
vantage one segment of society over another. The advantage, of
course, is practical as well. Where the evidence is ambiguous or un-
available, as it often is, burden allocation decisions permit one class
of contestants to prevail over another simply by asserting, "I am right
because you can not prove that I am wrong."42
D. Complexity and the "Common Nature of Things:" Lessons
From the Dowry Death and Related Criminal Laws
As we have seen, assigning the risk of non-persuasion to the de-
fendant subtly reinforces a transformative law's legitimacy and, from
both a rhetorical and a practical standpoint, advantages its propo-
nents and beneficiaries. Accordingly, it can provide a useful tool for
advancing the social and political goals underlying a transformative
legal regime. But other concerns, in particular fairness to the defend-
ant, must figure into burden allocation decisions as well. Fairness
concerns are important in the design of any legal institution, but they
loom even larger where a law imposes criminal sanctions. It is one
thing to allocate a burden of persuasion to make a symbolic state-
ment about the severity of a particular form of social injustice or the
strength of the state's resolve to correct it. It is quite another to im-
pose the very real practical consequences of that symbolic statement
on a criminal defendant.
Implicit judicial concerns about the fairness implications of alter-
native burden allocation rules surface in a variety of ways. In explor-
ing some of these, and in laying a foundation for comparisons
between Indian and American burden shifting arrangements, it is in-
structive to contrast the nature of the presumptions, and their effects
on burden allocations, contained in Sections 113-A and 113-B of the
Indian Evidence Act.




As described above,4 3 Section 113-A, appears to establish a pre-
sumption of fact in abetment of suicide cases where the prosecution
proves that prior to the suicide, the victim had been subjected to cru-
elty, defined either as harassment in connection with a demand for
dowry, 44 or as any willful conduct likely to drive the wife to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health.
4 5
The presumption raised under Section 113-A does not necessarily
shift the burden of persuasion; it necessarily shifts only the burden of
going forward with evidence.46 Section 113-B, on the other hand, ap-
plied in prosecutions under the Dowry Death Act, does automatically
shift the burden of persuasion. Why automatically shift the burden
of persuasion in the latter class of cases but make such a shift discre-
tionary in the former?
One possible explanation, of course, is simply that the difference
in burden allocations reflects political shifts in the Indian Parliament
between 1983 and 1986. But a close reading of Section 113-A indi-
cates that something more important to our present inquiry might
account for the difference.
In most instances in which presumptions of fact are established
in Indian statutes, the phrase "may presume" appears without modi-
fiers. Section 113-A is phrased somewhat differently. It states that
upon proof of the relevant facts predicate, a court in an abetment of
suicide case "may presume, having regard to all the other circum-
stances of the case," that the victim's suicide was abetted by the de-
fendant. This statutory "hedge" must reflect some concern that the
fairness implications of differing burden allocation arrangements
may, in abetment of suicide prosecutions, vary considerably from case
to case.
Clues as to the precise nature of these concerns can be found in a
1987 decision of the Punjab/Haryana High Court in the case of Balbir
Singh v. The State of Punjab.4 7 In Balbir Singh, the victim, a wife of
three to four years, committed suicide by self-immolation. Approxi-
mately four months before her death, she had been beaten by her
husband and her husband's mother, both of whom were charged with
abetment of suicide under Indian Penal Code Section 306. Both were
acquitted, and the original complainant (a relative of the victim) peti-
43. See text accompanying nn. 26-32, supra.
44. I.P.C. Section 498-A, subsection (b).
45. I.P.C. Section 498-A, subsection (a).
46. Under I.E.A. Section 113-A, a court has the discretion to shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant, which discretion is to be exercised "having regard to all
other circumstances of the case." V. Mohite and V. Chavan, supra n. 17, at 195, 198-
99. In this way, the presumption established by Section 113-A represents something
of a hybrid between the Indian presumption of fact and the presumption of law.
47. 1987 (1) Crimes 76.
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tioned the High Court for criminal revision. 48 The petition, as di-
rected against the husband, was based on the grounds that because
he had been convicted of cruelty under 498-A in connection with the
beating that preceded his wife's death, a presumption under Section
113-B should be drawn that he had abetted his wife's suicide.
In rejecting this argument, the High Court opined:
Any such presumption, if allowed to be drawn... would lead
to utter chaos and disintegration of the very institution of
matrimony. There is no gainsaying that with the ultimate
aim of eradicating the evil of dowry, suitable legislation like
the one noticed above has been enacted with a view to dis-
courage this age old custom, but at the same time these salu-
tary provisions cannot be allowed to be misused by the
parents or relatives of a psychopath wife who may have cho-
sen to end her life for reasons which may be many, other
than that of cruelty.49
This discussion reflects two concerns, one about decision making
under conditions of uncertainty and one about the potential abuse
and unfairness inherent in the statutory scheme.
As we have seen, judicial presumptions are sometimes con-
structed to correspond to legislative or judicial judgments about the
"common nature of things," or more technically stated, about the
probabilities associated with varying classes of events or alternative
explanatory theories. If a particular event is seen as having a
number of relatively equally probable causes, the case for establish-
ing a judicial presumption favoring one causal explanation over an-
other is relatively weak. Such a case is much stronger in situations
where the probabilities associated with one possible cause substan-
tially dominate the alternatives.
As the Court's discussion in Balbir Singh reflects, suicide, in In-
dia as in the United States, is at least as closely associated and per-
haps more closely associated with psychological imbalance on the
part of the victim as with mala fides on the part of outside actors. On
the whole, we (and I indicate here both Indian and American socie-
ties) have more ambivalent attitudes towards suicide victims than to-
wards murder victims. The victim in a suicide case, by her own
"deviant" action, has created a condition of causal uncertainty. We
feel less comfortable, in the absence of individuating information, in
presumptively attributing the act of taking one's own life to the
causal agency of another person. One can easily see how a legislature
48. Criminal revision, under Indian law, is the functional equivalent of reversal
on appeal. There being no double jeopardy prohibition under Indian law, a criminal





might feel more comfortable in establishing such a presumption in
cases of apparent murder, including those suggesting "staged acci-
dent," than in cases involving suicide.
With regard to the relative susceptibility of Sections 113-A and
113-B to abuse and unfairness, it is useful to compare the factual
predicate required to raise the presumption in each. Under Section
113-B, the prosecution must prove, among other things, cruelty or
harassment, not of any kind, but specifically in connection with a de-
mand for dowry. The making of a demand for dowry must be proven
by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Section 113-A
on the other hand, to raise the presumption of abetment of suicide the
prosecution must simply prove "cruelty," as that term is defined in
I.P.C. Section 498-A. While one prong of this definition - that involv-
ing harassment in connection with demands for dowry - is relatively
clear, the other is notoriously vague.
50
Given the indeterminacy of the concept of "cruelty," the Indian
legislature, like the Court in Balbir Singh, could easily have been
concerned about the potential for oppression inherent in a strong pre-
sumption of abetment of suicide in non-dowry related situations.
Members of the wife's family, distraught over the suicide and looking
for someone besides the victim to blame, could too easily attempt to
use ill-defined circumstances of domestic discord to hold a husband or
members of his family criminally liable for the wife's death. In light
of this possibility, the legislature could well have viewed the potential
for abuse and unfairness associated with a strong presumption, espe-
cially when combined with the attributional ambiguity attending sui-
cide, as too great.
Two general burden allocation principles, I suggest, can be seen
operating here. The first harkens back to the notion that the risk of
non-persuasion should correspond to "the common nature of things,"
best understood as an implicit assessment of the base rate probabili-
ties associated with various classes of events. Section 113-A, I sug-
gest, reflects the intuition that even if we could specify the base rate
contribution of domestic "cruelty" in causing suicides, the relevance
of that overall base rate in attributing the cause of a particular sui-
cide would vary widely from case to case. Let us explore this point
further.
Assume for a moment that the Indian Parliament based the bur-
den allocation rule constructed by I.E.A. Section 113-B on the belief
that, when an Indian woman dies of unnatural causes during the
early years of her marriage, and where shortly before her death she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with a demand
for dowry, the odds that her husband or his family caused her death
50. For a thorough discussion of the contested meaning of "cruelty" under I.P.C.
Section 498-A, see, V. Mohite and V. Chavan, supra n. 17, at 135-90.
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are greater than 50%. What if one adds additional facts to the pic-
ture, in particular, the fact that the woman's death was by suicide?
Does this additional fact change one's subjective assessment of the
probability that the death is attributable to the causal agency of the
husband or the husband's family? The court's opinion in Balbir
Singh suggests that it might, depending on the precise nature of the
additional facts. The assumed "common nature of things" connected
with suicide appears different from, and somewhat more complex and
situation-specific, than the "common nature of things" connected with
other kinds of homicide.
In short, in many situations particularized facts may have a suf-
ficiently significant impact on our subjective assessments of the rele-
vant base rate probabilities that we feel uncomfortable setting a
default burden allocation rule before such facts are specified. In such
situations, the preferred course of action might be to invest courts
with discretion to assign burdens of proof in accordance with the sub-
jective probability assessments indicated by the relevant, case-spe-
cific facts.
A second principle, sometimes referred to as the "disfavored con-
tention" or "disfavored party" rationale, might also be seen operating
in I.E.A. §113-A. This principle places the burden of persuasion on a
party advancing a disfavored claim, or on a party who is him or her-
self disfavored as a consequence of prior, proven conduct connected
with the events at issue in the case.51 Certain claims or defenses
may be judicially disfavored, and this disfavor expressed by assigning
the burden of persuasion on the issue to the party raising it.52 In
other situations, a party may be assigned the burden of persuasion
because, through his own conduct, he has created juridical uncer-
tainty on the relevant contested issue. In American law, the most
celebrated illustration of this principle is the case of Summers v.
Tice,5 3 in which the California Supreme Court shifted to the defend-
ants the burden of persuasion on the issue of causation-in-fact, where
both defendants had negligently fired rifle shots, one or the other of
which had hit the plaintiff. A more modern version of the disfavored
party principle can be found in a 1977 Title VII case, International
51. For a discussion of the operation of this principle in American evidence law,
see, e.g., Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading, supra n. 41, at 11; Martinez,
"Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the Burden of Proof in Tax Cases," 39
Hastings L. J. 239, 252 (1988).
52. The treatment of contributory negligence frequently fits this description. See,
e.g., Epstein, "Pleadings and Presumptions," 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556, 598 (1973)(Rule
allocating burden of proving contributory negligence on the defendant demonstrates
judicial disapproval of a legal principle which operates to excuse the defendant's own
negligent conduct. This disapproval overrides more general principle that the burden
of proving an issue should normally be placed on the party possessing more ready
access to the relevant evidence.)
53. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
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Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,54 in which the United
States Supreme Court shifted to the defendant the burden of persua-
sion on the issue of discriminatory intent in "Stage 2" individual re-
lief proceedings, once the court had found that the defendant had
discriminated against the plaintiff class as a whole. Having been
shown to have violated the statute, the Court in effect determined
that the defendant's denial of discrimination in any particular case
should be viewed with disfavor, and the burden of persuasion as-
signed accordingly.
The difference between the presumptions raised under Indian
Evidence Code Sections 113-A and 113-B can also be understood in
light of this "disfavored party" principle. Where under Section 113-B,
the prosecution has proven that the defendant had subjected the vic-
tim to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with a demand for
dowry, a mandatory presumption, shifting the burden of persuasion
on the question of causation, is raised. By violating the Dowry Prohi-
bition Act, the defendant has become, in effect, a disfavored party,
justifying the imposition upon him or her of the risk of non-
persuasion.
In abetment of suicide prosecutions, whether the defendant
should be treated as a disfavored party for burden allocation pur-
poses is substantially more complicated. Recall that prosecutions for
abetment of suicide can proceed absent a demand for dowry, so long
as "cruelty," as defined in I.P.C. Section 498-A, subsection (a) is
proven. Such "cruelty" has been interpreted to include treatment as
widely divergent as baseless accusations of infidelity55 or inability to
conceive a child,56 repeatedly coming home drunk late at night over
the wife's persistent protests,57 and repeated beatings, verbal abuse,
and withholding of food and access to her natal family by victim's
husband and mother-in-law. 58 Conduct constituting cruelty may or
may not be accompanied by demands for dowry. In other words, vio-
lations of I.P.C. 498-A may be associated with conduct justifying va-
rying levels of moral opprobrium, and may be associated or
disassociated with the practice of dowry.
Thus I suggest, where an abetment of suicide defendant has been
guilty of "cruelty," as that term is defined in I.P.C. §498-A, but has
made no demand for dowry, he or she is prima facie less disfavored
54. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
55. See, e.g., Rishi Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1988(1) Cri. L.C. 378(Punjab and
Haryana High Court).
56. See, e.g., Renu, et al. v. State of Haryana, 1990(3) Crimes 226.(Punjab and
Haryana High Court).
57. Jagdesh Chander v. State of Haryana, 1988 Cri. L. J. 1048. But see, P. Bik-
shapathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1989 Cri. L. J. 1186 (Andhra Pradesh High
Court)(Daily consumption of liquor and coming home drunk not "per se" cruelty under
Section 498-a).
58. Anjanabai v. State of Maharashtra, 1988 Mh. IU. 641 (Bombay High Court).
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than would be the case had a demand for dowry been made. Whether
a particular abetment of suicide defendant's conduct has been suffi-
ciently opprobrious as to render him or her "disfavored" within the
meaning of the disfavored party principle will depend on the particu-
lar facts and circumstances of any given case. One of these facts will
be the presence or absence of a demand for dowry.
In summary, in abetment of suicide cases, individualized facts
will influence judicial judgments regarding both the prior probabili-
ties associated with competing causal theories and the normative
standing of the defendant. Accordingly, in an abetment of suicide
prosecution, I.E.A. Section 113-B gives the court discretion, having
regard to all the other circumstances of the case, either to shift the
burden of persuasion on the question of causation to the defendant,
or to leave it with the prosecution, where it normally would rest.
In attempting to determine whether considerations such as these
in fact animate judicial application of the presumption established by
Section 113-A, it is useful to examine how the discretion that section
provides is being exercised by the Indian Courts. In Samir v. State of
West Bengal,59 the Calcutta High Court opined that in applying Sec-
tion 113-A, a decision whether or not to shift the burden of persua-
sion to the defendant must ultimately turn on those factors which
point to the existence of a causal nexus between the proven cruelty
and the subsequent suicide. These factors include: the making and
persistence of requests for dowry; whether those requests had been
complied with or remained outstanding; the nature of the alleged cru-
elty; and the strength of the evidence establishing it.60
In addition to the factors considered in Samir v. State of West
Bengal, the Court in Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana,61 also
weighed the fact that, following the victim's lighting herself on fire,
members of the husband's family failed to come to her aid. And, in
State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh,62 the Court also considered the tem-
poral proximity between the victim's act in setting herself and her
children on fire and the proven cruelty, which cruelty consisted of
taunts, torture, beating, and demands for dowry. In all of these
cases, both the disfavored party principle and the use of individual-
ized facts to assess the relative prior probabilities of competing
causal theories can be seen as influencing the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion under Section 113-A. Significantly, it is in those cases most
directly implicating the goals of transformative dowry prohibition
59. (1991) 2 Crimes 867 (Calcutta High Court).
60. Accord, Shyama Devi v. State of West Bengal, 1987 Cri. L.J. 1163 (Calcutta
High Court)(considering the making and persistence of requests for dowry, whether
such requests were outstanding, and the nature and strength of proof of alleged
cruelty).
61. AIR 1989 SC 378.
62. AIR 1991 SC 1532.
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laws that courts are most apt to shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant.
In summary, various Indian anti-subordination statutes, includ-
ing but not limited to the Protection of Civil Rights Act, the Dowry
Prohibition (Amendment) Act, and the Criminal Law (Second
Amendment) Act, use evidentiary presumptions and burdens of proof
to counter threats to transformative law posed by traditional norma-
tive systems. Strong presumptions of law, which shift the burden of
persuasion, and weaker presumptions of fact which do not, perform
different functions and reflect differing assessments of the relative
policy costs and benefits associated with each. Before analyzing the
nature and function of these allocation rules any further, let us ex-
plore the nature of presumptions and burdens of proof in the most
frequently mobilized American civil rights law, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
III. BURDENS OF PROOF IN AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS LAws:
THE CASE OF TITLE VII
The Civil Rights Act of 196463 was passed at the height of the
American civil rights movement of the 1950's and 1960's. While it
addresses discrimination on the basis of sex, national origin, and reli-
gion as well as race, it was designed primarily to address the system-
atic social, political, and economic subordination of African-
Americans.
Parallels between the historic treatment of African-Americans
and those designated as "Untouchables" in India can meaningfully be
drawn. American Blacks suffered hundreds of years of chattel slav-
ery, followed by over a hundred years more of legally and/or socially
enforced segregation. Across the American South, American Blacks
were subjected to formal civil disabilities including exclusion from
the elective franchise and from public accommodations such as ho-
tels, restaurants, transportation by common carrier, hospitals, and
other business and service establishments. In the South by law, and
in other parts of the United States by custom, Blacks were subjected
to residential segregation, segregation into menial occupations, ex-
clusion from state and private educational programs and large sec-
tors of employment, as well as most licensed trades and professions.
Among Whites, blackness was widely associated with what might
best be understood as a secular version of ritual impurity. Through-
out the United States, Whites tended to avoid close association with
Blacks, except in situations where Blacks inhabited clearly defined,
socially inferior roles. Until the 1950's intermarriage between mem-
bers of different races was prohibited in many American states. Even
63. 42 U. S. C. §2000e, et seq., as amended.
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now, it continues to be socially stigmatized in many, if not all, parts
of the country.
Even after civil disabilities imposed on African Americans were
removed by Warren Court era interpretations of the post-Civil War
Civil Rights Acts, those disabilities continued to be socially enforced
in much the same way as in post-Constitution India, through private
"self-help" involving social boycotts and violent reprisals.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, like the Untouchability (Offences)
Act of 1955, was enacted to redress the public and private enforce-
ment of civil disabilities which a substantial segment of the popula-
tion, at least in a majority of states in the American federation, had
come to see as immoral. Like the UOA, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
a federal law. Unlike the UOA, it provides a civil rather than crimi-
nal right of action. Aggrieved individuals, along with the federal gov-
ernment, have standing to sue in the federal district courts to enforce
the Act's various provisions.
Title VII, the most frequently mobilized portion of the 1964 Act,
prohibits and provides civil remedies for discrimination in employ-
ment based on race, color, sex, national origin, or religion. The Act
covers employment or referral to employment by state and local gov-
ernments, federal government agencies, unions, employment agen-
cies, and private businesses employing 15 or more employees. In
most suits under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that the negative
action taken against him resulted from intentional discrimination on
a ground prohibited by the Act.6 4 This of course requires proof of a
defendant's subjective state of mind, a task associated with substan-
tial difficulty for both litigants and fact-finders. Given that employ-
ers rarely admit to discriminatory motives or leave paper trails from
which an inference of discriminatory motive could easily be drawn,
American courts have struggled since the early 1970's to construct a
workable framework for the consideration and determination of this
crucial element of liability in employment discrimination suits.
In an early case, McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,6 5 the
United States Supreme Court set out a three part analysis for the
evaluation of what came to be known as an "individual disparate
treatment" case. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plain-
tiff must first establish a prima facie case. In the context of alleged
64. In a small subclass of Title VII cases, a plaintiff can prevail by showing that a
facially neutral employment practice had a disproportionately negative impact on a
group protected by the Act. One common misperception about Title VII is that a
plaintiff can prevail in virtually any case by proving disparate impact. This is incor-
rect. Various legal requirements pertaining to the identification of a specific employ-
ment practice, and proof of a causal connection between that specific practice and a
statistically significant disparate impact on the relevant applicant group have sharply
narrowed the range of cases in which disparate impact theory can be used.
65. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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hiring discrimination, for example, a plaintiff does this by
demonstrating:
(i) That (s)he is a member of a class protected by Title
VII;
(ii) That (s)he applied for and was qualified for a position
as to which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) That, despite his or her qualifications, (s)he was not
hired; and
(iv) That the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applications from persons with compa-
rable qualifications. 6
6
The juridical function of this prima facie case, stated the Court on
another occasion, was to "eliminate the most common nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection,"67 most notably, a failure to
apply at a time when the employer had job openings available, or the
applicant's failure to satisfy minimum qualification requirements.
After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant to articulate one or more legitimate nondis-
criminatory reasons for its decision. Assuming that the employer
does so, and it usually does, the analysis proceeds to a third and final
stage, in which the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove that the
reason proffered by the defendant was not its real reason, but rather
a pretext for invidious discrimination of a species prohibited by the
Act. 68
Following the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas,
the federal courts split on the question of whether the burden that
shifted to the defendant at the second of these three stages was a
burden of persuasion, analogous to the presumption of law raised
under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act in dowry death cases,
or merely a burden of producing evidence, akin to the Indian pre-
sumption of fact. The conflict was resolved in 1981, when the
Supreme Court decided Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine.69
In Burdine, the Court held the burden that shifts to the defend-
ant is not a burden of persuasion, but only a burden of coming for-
ward with evidence. Assuming that the defendant satisfies this
burden by proffering admissible evidence of a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the challenged decision, the presumption of dis-
crimination raised by the prima facie case "drops from the case." In
order to prevail, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's prof-
66. 411 U.S. at 802 (footnote omitted).
67. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 &
n. 44 (1977).
68. 411 U.S. 792, 798.
69. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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fered reason was a pretext for discrimination. Pretext, instructed the
Court, could be proven "directly," by showing that some other reason
(i.e., the plaintiffs race, sex, national origin, etc... ) more likely moti-
vated the decision, or "indirectly," by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation was "unworthy of credence."70
In the years that followed Burdine, this latter method became
the most common device by which Title VII plaintiffs proved discrimi-
natory grounds based on circumstantial evidence alone. This was
largely because, by the 1980's, few U.S. employers had official policies
excluding women or minorities from particular classes of jobs, as had
been the widespread practice when Title VII was first enacted. Simi-
larly, by the 1980's, most people had learned, whatever their private
attitudes might be, not to make statements indicative of racist, sex-
ist, or otherwise prejudiced attitudes. "Direct evidence" of bias was
rarely available to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases.
Thus, with increasing frequency plaintiffs sought to prove pre-
text in the second manner prescribed in Burdine, by showing that the
employer's proffered reasons were "unworthy of credence." In partic-
ular, plaintiffs would commonly seek to discredit the reason(s) offered
by the defendant by showing that similarly situated employees who
were not in the plaintiffs social group had been treated more favora-
bly, or in discipline or termination cases less harshly, than the plain-
tiff had been treated. By discrediting the employer's stated reason in
this way, plaintiffs hoped that the trier of fact would infer that the
real reason for the employer's action was discrimination of a kind
prohibited by the Act.
The logic underlying this "presumption of invidiousness" was
most clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in the 1978 case of
Furnco v. Waters, in which the Court opined:
[W] e know from our experience that more often than not peo-
ple do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any un-
derlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus,
when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have
been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's ac-
tions, it is more likely than not the employer, whom we gen-
erally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision
on an impermissible consideration such as race. 71
As one can see from this excerpt, the indirect model of pretext proof
rested on two implicit assumptions: 1) that, unless they are discrimi-
nating, employers are rational actors; and 2) that discrimination of
the kind proscribed by Title VII, though subtle and largely covert,
was still prevalent in American society. The presumption raised by
plaintiffs proof of pretext thus reflected a particular understanding
70. 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 10.
71. 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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of the "common nature of things," namely, an understanding that dis-
crimination in the American labor market, while unlawful and cov-
ert, was still widespread.
Over the course of the 1980's, this belief about the "common na-
ture of things," and in particular, the belief that discrimination re-
mained widespread in American society, began to erode in both
popular and judicial thought and discourse. The result, at least in
the domain of Title VII disparate treatment litigation, was the devel-
opment of yet another dispute over the nature and operation of the
presumption raised by the Title VII individual treatment plaintiffs
prima facie case.
The question at stake in what came to be known as the "pretext
plus controversy" 72 was this: in an individual disparate treatment
case, what residual effect should the presumption raised by the
prima facie case have in situations where the plaintiff proves that the
reasons proffered by the defendant to explain its decision are "unwor-
thy of belief?" In such situations, should the trier of fact, by virtue of
the presumption raised by the prima facie case, be compelled, as a
matter of law, to find for the plaintiff? Should the plaintiff, as a mat-
ter of law, be required to prove MORE than the elements of the prima
facie case and the falsity of the defendant's proffered reason? Or,
should the trier of fact simply be instructed to consider all the evi-
dence, independent of the influence of any presumption, and deter-
mine whether the plaintiff has proven discrimination on the grounds
of his or her group status by a preponderance of the evidence?73
In 1993, in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,74 a sharply divided
U.S. Supreme Court chose the last of these three possible solutions to
the pretext plus problem. Harkening back to its decision in Burdine,
the Court held that once the defendant comes forward with evidence
of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action, the presump-
tion raised by the prima facie case indeed "drops from the case." The
presumption of discrimination so raised, once met by evidence of
some legitimate non-discriminatory reason, has no remaining eviden-
tiary significance. Simply stated, in an action for discrimination
under Title VII, the burden of proof as to grounds remains at all
times on the plaintiff, without regard, in the language of I.P.C. Sec-
tion 113-A, to "all the other circumstances of the case."
72. See generally, Lanctot, "The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fal-
lacy of the "Pretext Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases," 43 Hastings L.
J. 57 (1991).
73. Curiously, no court suggested that in a case of this type, the burden of persua-
sion on the issue of intent should be shifted to the discredited defendant.
74. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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IV. INTERROGATING HicKs-. AMERICAN & INDIAN LAW IN DIALOGUE
Although the American civil rights community decried the deci-
sion in Hicks as an extreme example of judicial activism on the part
of a conservative, civil rights-hostile Court, one might reasonably ar-
gue that the holding was dictated by well-established principles of
American evidence law. To understand how this might be the case, it
is useful to reconsider the nature of judicial presumptions under In-
dian law, and then to contrast that framework with its American
counterpart.
As described earlier, Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Code de-
fines two different types of presumptions. The presumption of fact,
signaled by the phrase "may presume," requires the party against
whom it is raised to come forward with evidence, lest judgment be
taken against it. While this presumption "requires a party to speak,"
and to a certain extent assigns the risks of factual indeterminacy in a
manner different than it might otherwise be, it does not shift the bur-
den of persuasion. The legal presumption, signaled by the language
"shall presume" however, does operate to shift the burden of persua-
sion. This presumption can be raised even as to issues which would
otherwise constitute an essential element of the plaintiff or prosecu-
tion's case in chief.
In the United States, federal evidence jurisprudence has no real
counterpart to the Indian "presumption of law." Rule 301 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence provides:
PRESUMPTIONS IN GENERAL IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEED-
INGS. - In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise
provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presump-
tion imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but it does not shift to such party the burden of
proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which re-
mains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was
originally cast.
Rule 301, as adopted by the United States Congress in 1975, dif-
fers substantially from the version proposed by the Advisory Commit-
tee and approved by the Supreme Court. The Advisory Committee
rule would have defined presumptions as shifting the burden of per-
suasion instead of just the burden of coming forward with evidence.
In the language of the Indian Evidence Code, it was a "shall presume"
rule, rather than a "may presume" rule. This was the approach advo-
cated by Professor Morgan, in his debate with Professor Thayer over
the proper function of presumptions in relation to the burden of proof.
In Rule 301, Congress adopted the "bursting bubble" approach
advocated by Professor Thayer. Under this approach, applied by the
Supreme Court in Burdine and again in Hicks, after a presumption is
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raised, and after the party against whom it is raised comes forward
with admissible evidence to meet it, the presumption "bursts," and
has no remaining evidentiary significance, although the evidence
which gave rise to it remains in the case. The burden of persuasion
remains where it always was, on the party on whom it was originally
cast. Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide no burden-shifting
mechanism analogous to the Indian Evidence Act's Section 4 pre-
sumption of law, and, needless to say, no even more flexible tool such
as that made available in abetment of suicide prosecutions by Section
113-A.
A literal reading of Rule 301 would suggest that only Congress,
and never the courts, could re-allocate burdens of persuasion in fed-
eral civil or criminal actions. This however is not the case. The fed-
eral courts have on many occasions allocated burdens of persuasion
in a manner consistent with perceived policy goals. In the absence of
Congressional direction, the federal courts have made their own allo-
cation decisions in First Amendment freedom of speech cases, 75 Title
VII disparate impact cases, 76 admiralty cases, 77 and, in certain situa-
tions, actions for breach of contract, 78 to name but a few. In fact, in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,79 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
once a Title VII plaintiff proves that her protected group status was a
"motivating factor" in an employer's decision, the burden of persua-
sion on the issue of causation shifts to the defendant. Thus, literal
readings of Rule 301 aside, the result reached in Hicks was perhaps
not compelled by that Rule, but rather represents a subtle political
choice between those competing policy interests always at stake in
presumption and burden of proof allocation decisions.
The nature of those competing policy interests, and their relation
to my earlier-posited distinction between normal, transformative,
and captured law, can be illustrated by reference to the dispute over
the soundness and significance of Hicks that developed in response to
the decision's pronouncement in 1993. One group of legal commenta-
75. Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)(allo-
cating burden of proof to defendant in a "mixed motive" case brought by a tenured
public school teacher alleging failure to rehire in retaliation for exercising First
Amendment rights).
76. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971)(placing burden of proof
as to business necessity on the defendant in a disparate impact case).
77. Hood v. Knappton Corp., Inc. 986 F.2d 329, 331-332 ( 9 th Cir. 1993), citing, The
Louisiana, 70 U.S. (3 Wall) 164 (1865)(allocating burden of proof to a drifting vessel in
admiralty actions to further policy goal of avoiding maritime accidents); accord,
James v. River Parishes Co., Inc. 686 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5' Cir. 1982).
78. E.g., United States v. New York, N.H. & H. Ry., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n. 5 (1957)
(availability of cars of the size ordered, where defendant had supplied cars of a differ-
ent size); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 426 U. S. 290 (1976)(placing burden of proof on defendant to show
that it did not breach its own rules in action involving over-booking of airline flights).
79. 450 U.S. 257 (1981).
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tors, best represented by Professor Deborah Calloway,80 argues that
the decision in Hicks was not only wrong as a matter of law, but rep-
resents a fundamental retreat from an earlier judicial commitment to
the struggle for civil rights. In other words Calloway argues, Hicks
goes a long way toward making Title VII "captured" rather than
"transformative" law.
According to this view, the indirect model of proof constructed in
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine rested on an assumption that, ab-
sent some clearly articulated, non-discredited explanation, the ad-
verse treatment of the groups protected by the 1964 Civil Rights Act
more likely than not results from discrimination. According to Callo-
way, it is this "basic assumption" that the Court in Hicks rejects. In
doing so she argues, the Court impliedly rejected the claim that dis-
crimination continues to be "a vital part of contemporary American
social and political life."8 Calloway therefore sees Hicks' disposition
of the burden of proof problem there raised as invested with profound
political and rhetorical significance. "[R]ejecting the basic assump-
tion that unexplained adverse conduct towards women and minori-
ties is the result of discrimination," states Calloway, "denies the
continued existence of discrimination itself."
8 2
A second group of commentators, best represented by Professor
Deborah Malamud,8 3 argues that Hicks was correctly decided and
takes issues with the larger political claims made by commentators
like Professor Calloway. Specifically, Professor Malamud contests
Calloway's assertion that the burden of proof in discrimination cases
should be allocated in accordance with beliefs about the prevalence of
discrimination in society. Malamud argues that whether discrimina-
tion remains prevalent or not in no way determines whether a partic-
ular unexplained adverse action towards a particular woman or
minority group member on a particular occasion can fairly be attrib-
uted to that cause.
But such is always the case, whenever burdens of proof are allo-
cated in accordance with the base rate prior probabilities assumed to
be associated with various explanatory theories or classes of events,
or as the result of a deliberate decision to allocate to one rather than
80. Calloway, "St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assump-
tion," 26 Conn. L. J. 997 (1994). Other significant contributions to on this side of the
debate include, Selmi, "Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme
Court Rhetoric," 86 Geo. L. J. 279 (1997); and Cunniff, "The Price of Equal Opportu-
nity: The Efficiency of Title VII After Hicks," 45 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 507 (1995).
81. Selmi, supra n. 80, at 284.
82. Calloway, supra n. 80, at 1036.
83. Malamud, "The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks," 93 Mich. L.
Rev. 2229 (1995). For another contribution coming to some of the same conclusions,
but positioned substantially farther to the political right than Malamud, see Shuman,
"The Politics of Presumption: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and the Burdens of




another group of potential litigants the risks associated with factual
indeterminacy. When used in this way, burdens of proof serve to as-
sign the risk of* non-persuasion to that group of potential litigants
which, as a class, is either best-positioned to bear it, or which, accord-
ing to our admittedly subjective assumptions about prior probabili-
ties, will be wrongly denied judgment least often.
In essence, I would suggest, Malamud and Calloway are arguing
over whether or not Title VII should still be viewed as "transforma-
tive law," or whether it is now more accurately characterized as "nor-
mal law," that is, law which seeks to enforce prevailing social norms
against a small, deviant class of lawbreakers. If Title VII is properly
seen as "normal law," than perhaps Professor Malamud is correct.
But if it is still "transformative law," than Professor Calloway has the
better argument.
Let us play this thought out a bit further, and connect it back to
what we learned about burdens of proof and presumption in Indian
anti-subordination law. Professor Calloway argues that courts adju-
dicating discrimination cases should enforce what she refers to as the
"basic assumption" through the operation of something akin to an In-
dian presumption of law precisely because triers of fact in Title VII
cases can not be counted on to agree with it.84 In essence, Calloway
argues that, at least in cases in which the defendant's proffered rea-
sons for a contested decision have been rejected as unworthy of belief,
a mandatory presumption should be used to constrain the power of
traditional norms to bias fact-finder inference and thereby frustrate
the effective operation of the transformative legal regime.
In response, Malamud argues that, "deciding cases on the basis
of a mandatory presumption that is inconsistent with contemporary
beliefs about the nature of discrimination raises important questions
about the legitimacy of the enterprise."85 But again, all transforma-
tive law functions in precisely this way. It will always eventually, if
not immediately and continuously, be challenged, its legitimacy
called into question by proponents of the old normative system.
Malamud's argument against Calloway, at least in this narrow re-
spect and if taken to its logical conclusion, represents an attack on
the legitimacy of all transformative law, whether it be Title VII, the
Untouchability Offences Act, the Dowry Prohibition Act, affirmative
action programs promulgated by executive order, or ground breaking
judicial decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education.
8 6
84. See, Calloway, supra n. 80, at 1008.
85. Malamud, supra n. 83, at 2260.
86. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that racial segregation in public education deprived African Americans of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. In so doing, it rejected the "separate but equal" doctrine an-
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Perhaps in all contexts, but most particularly I would argue in
the context of transformative law, one important function performed
by presumptions and burdens of proof is precisely their capacity to
constrain biases in fact-finder inference stemming from the subtle or
blatant operation of the traditional normative regime. Legal adjudi-
cation necessarily requires fact finders to evaluate, draw inferences
from, and choose between competing factual accounts. Where a
member of a subordinated group seeks to enforce a law which di-
verges from traditional social norms, individuals implicitly or explic-
itly loyal to those traditional norms will tend to resolve factual
ambiguities in ways that favor the defense and disfavor the
prosecution.
The biases which give rise to this "prosecutorial disadvantage"
need not be conscious or intentional. Stereotypes associated with
members of subordinated social groups, other schematic expectancies
as to the "common nature of things," subtle social biases in the as-
sessment of witness credibility, all of these tend to "stack the deck"
against the plaintiff or prosecution in cases involving transformative
law. Allocating the risk of non-persuasion to the defendant in such
cases may reset the balance of adjudication risk at a more appropri-
ate level than that at which it might otherwise come to rest.
It can not reasonably be argued that evidentiary devices can
never legitimately be used to constrain popular beliefs about "the
common nature of things." Such a principle would necessarily re-
quire the abolition of many well-established principles of American
and Indian evidence law, such as rules prohibiting the use of evi-
dence of character or past acts in civil cases to prove action in con-
formity therewith.8 7 Accordingly, the question should be "when" and
not "whether" it is appropriate to use burdens of proof of presump-
tions to counter popular assumptions about "the common nature of
things."
Let us first consider the possibility that different considerations
should drive policy making in this arena depending on whether we
are dealing with normal or transformative law. It is reasonable to
argue, at least as a starting point, that the burden of proof as to all
elements of a case or claim should fall on that party - the plaintiff in
a civil case and the prosecution in a criminal case - that makes a
claim of mala fides against another person. Professor Dale Nance
takes this position: in the absence of sufficient evidence adduced to
show otherwise, one ought to presume that a person has acted in ac-
nounced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896 ), which doctrine had previously
been used to justify state-enforced segregation in the American South.




cordance with serious social obligations. s8 This precept, which Nance
refers to as "the principle of civility," is said to lie at the heart of
liberal pluralistic community. Failing to presume that people will act
in accordance with their legal obligations "denies them, in a sense,
the dignity associated with their status as a full member of the
community."8 9
While Nance's principle of civility might be sound where normal
law is concerned, I am skeptical about its wisdom - or even its logi-
cal validity - in cases involving transformative law. Nance's precept
rests on the assumption that most people will act in accordance with
established social norms. But what happens in situations involving
normative instability, or situations in which formal legal norms di-
verge from local or traditional norms? What in that context does it
mean for someone to behave "in accordance with serious social
obligations?"
Transformative law deliberately seeks to displace a well-en-
trenched framework of "serious social obligations." People have dif-
ferent social reference groups, some of which may be loyal to the very
social norms transformative law seeks to displace. People may derive
their status as "full members of the community" more by meeting
traditional normative expectations than by complying with trans-
formative legal rules. As I suggested in the Introduction to this es-
say, rules designed with normal law in mind may work
fundamentally different results where transformative law is con-
cerned. In presumption or burden allocation decisions involving in-
stances of transformative law, I suggest, Nance's "principle of
civility" has little role to play.
To the contrary, where transformative law is concerned, the sen-
sible "default setting" would more likely be to place the burden of
persuasion on whatever party is most likely to be aligned with tradi-
tional social norms. Such an arrangement would be justified for vari-
ety of reasons.
Consider, for example, the problem of witness cooperation. As
earlier described, transformative law can be thwarted where wit-
nesses, because of social pressure, group alliances, or allegiance to
the traditional normative system, refuse to provide the testimony
needed to make successful mobilization of the new legal rules possi-
ble. This serious problem of witness non-cooperation is frequently
cited to justify the legal presumption of culpability in dowry death
cases under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. Placing the
burden of proof on the defendant in such circumstances, while it does
not protect against outright perjury, at least deprives the defendant
88. Nance, "Civility and Burdens of Proof," 17 Harv. J. of Law and Public Policy
647 (1994).
89. Id. at 653.
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of Gaskin's argument from ignorance: "I am right because you can not
prove that I am wrong."90
A second justification for this view derives from the rhetorical or
symbolic purposes served by burdens of proof and presumptions. As
Marc Galanter has observed, perhaps the most important feature of
anti-subordination legislation like the Protection of Civil Rights Act
is what he terms its "general symbolic output."91 The acceptance or
rejection of burden allocation rules, which express legislative or judi-
cial adherence to one or another claim about "the way things are,"
necessarily privileges one world view over another, one group of pro-
spective litigants over another, and one set of political priorities over
another. As Gaskins suggests, burdens of proof and presumptions
structure the parameters of discourse, and distribute in a political as
well as in a legal sense the costs of uncertainty. 92
Given the practical difficulties attending the mobilization of for-
mal legal rights by members of subordinated groups, the tendency of
popular normative systems to generate fact-finder bias, the exploita-
tion of loopholes and other weaknesses in the law by judges loyal to
the traditional regime, and the reluctance of witnesses to come for-
ward in the face of potential boycotts and reprisals, there is little rea-
son to treat transformative law and normal law the same where
presumption or burden allocation decisions are concerned. The In-
dian experience makes plain what we who have grown accustomed to
the American system may no longer be able to see: the allocation of
burdens of proof and the construction of judicial presumptions are
important tools through which proponents of transformative law may
counteract the resistance inevitably mounted, in a host of subtle and
not so subtle ways, by the traditional normative system it seeks to
displace.
One important question left hanging, of course, is whether Title
VII is normal law or transformative law. This is a complex, essen-
tially empirical question, and its resolution lies largely outside the
scope of this short essay. But I wish to suggest, at least with respect
to the problem presented by Hicks, that insights provided by Indian
law can help move the debate forward whatever the correct answer to
this question might be.
Consider once more the distinction between the presumption of
fact arising in abetment of suicide cases and the presumption of law
arising in cases under the Dowry Death Act. As we earlier saw, the
difference between the weaker, discretionary presumption applied in
the first class of cases, and the relatively strong burden shifting pre-
sumption automatically raised in the second is justified on two
90. Gaskins, supra n. 40.
91. M. Galanter, Law and Society in Modern India, supra n. 1, at 218.
92. Gaskins, supra n. 40.
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grounds. First, where suicide is concerned, a wider variety causes
may more convincingly explain the act upon which the adjudication
focuses than obtains in other prosecuted cases of apparent homicide.
Second, in the case of suicide, the victim herself has, by her own ac-
tion, created the uncertainty the burden of which the court must now
assign to one or the other party. How might these two principles be
applied to the problem of allocating the risks associated with factual
indeterminacy in Title VII disparate treatment cases?
In bringing an individual disparate treatment claim under Title
VII, the plaintiff contends that a particular employment decision was
taken against him because of his social group status. The employer
claims that the decision was taken for some legitimate, non-discrimi-
natory reason, which reason, under Burdine, the employer is com-
pelled to state. Professor Malamud is probably correct in
maintaining that, subsequent Supreme Court dicta aside, the weak
showing required to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell-
Douglas and Burdine does not in fact eliminate the most common
reasons for the kinds of employment actions challenged in Title VII
adjudications. Even after a plaintiff in a hiring case shows that he
was minimally qualified for a position, or after a plaintiff in a termi-
nation case shows that she was performing a job for which she was
qualified, there are many things besides discrimination which might
explain the employer's decision. In short, I agree with Professor
Malamud when she argues that the threshold established by the ele-
ments of the McDonnell-Douglas/Burdine prima facie case were
never set sufficiently high to justify shifting the burden of persuasion
to the defendant, assuming it did not belong there in the first place.
I would urge however that the policy balance shifts dramatically,
in ways Professor Malamud fails to address, once a Title VII defend-
ant's proffered non-discriminatory reason is disbelieved. Once the
defendant has spoken, and once the trier of fact has judged his articu-
lated reasons unworthy of belief, the individual disparate treatment
defendant should be treated as a disfavored party, and the burden of
persuasion on the question of discriminatory intent reassigned to
him. Like the mixed motives defendant in Price Waterhouse, or the
Stage 2 defendant in Teamsters v. United States, or like a defendant
charged with dowry death under Sections 304-B of the Indian Penal
Code, the defendant in a pretext plus case has, by his proffer of a false
explanation, engaged in conduct which itself changes the balance of
probabilities on the question of discriminatory intent. Under a "prior
probabilities" approach to burden-shifting, there is good reason to re-
assign the burden of persuasion on the issue of intent to the defend-
ant in such a case.
Furthermore, in a Hicks-type situation, the defendant's proffer of
a false explanation for its actions has rendered the court's and the
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opposing party's search for truth substantially more difficult and has
exposed the entire proceeding to a heightened risk of juridical error.
There is no sound justification for imposing the cost of this obfusca-
tion on the plaintiff. Nor is there any clear reason to apply Nance's
principle of civility to a party whose testimony has been disbelieved.
At one point in her analysis, Professor Malamud states that,
even after showing that the employer's proffered reason was not its
real reason, the possibility that the trier of fact would reject the attri-
bution to race was "a risk Hicks had to take."93 But if we are arguing
about the proper allocation of burdens of persuasion, this assertion
begs the cental question. Why, under the circumstances, should this
be a risk that Hicks, and not the defendant, "has to take?" Where a
defendant in a Title VII action has proffered a particular reason justi-
fying its challenged decision, and the plaintiff has shown that reason
to be pretextual, any remaining uncertainty as to the employer's real
reasons is uncertainty of the employer's making. Why should that
risk be assigned to the plaintiff, and not, as in the case of suicide
under I. P. C. Section 113-B, to the party (or party's champion) whose
action created the uncertainty in the first place?
Thus, even if we accept that Title VII is "normal law" in the
sense that most negative employment actions taken against women
and protected minorities are attributable to causes other than dis-
crimination, it does not follow that, in cases where the defendant has
created juridical uncertainty by proffering a false reason for its ac-
tion, the risks attending that uncertainty should be imposed on the
plaintiff. If we view Title VII as transformative rather than normal
law, the case for assigning plaintiff the risk of nonpersuasion in such
a case is weaker still.
Ultimately in my view, Hicks suggests that even with respect to
litigation under a single statute, there may be some instances in
which a Thayer-style bursting bubble presumption is warranted, and
other instances in which a Morgan-style presumption does more of
the necessary juridical work. But unlike the Indian Evidence Act,
which makes both types of presumptions available to legislative or
judicial decision makers, and in certain classes of cases, invests the
court with discretion to tailor burden allocations to the particular
facts of the case, the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for only one.
Perhaps the Indian experience suggests that the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence provide an inadequate set of tools for solving the particular
problem illustrated by Hicks. As Professor Ronald Allen suggested
in 1982, long before the pretext plus problem emerged, the univalent
approach to evidentiary presumptions embodied in Rule 301 is inade-
quate to deal with the many and varied problems that burdens of
93. Malamud, supra n. 83, at 2272.
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proof and presumptions were designed to address. 94 While the infer-
ence reasonably drawn from the elements of a plaintiffs prima facie
case may in most cases be sufficiently weak as to justify only a Rule
301-style presumption akin to the Indian presumption of fact, such
may not be the case after a plaintiff has also demonstrated the falsity
of the defendant's supposedly legitimate non-discriminatory reasons.
American evidence law, this observation suggests, provides only one
tool where a second would be useful.
V. CONCLUSION
It is often said that the study of foreign legal systems has the
salutary effect of freeing us from the blinders imposed by our own
customs, presuppositions, and forms, exposing the contingency of our
own legal order and illustrating the variety of available choices and
frames. Unfortunately, that enterprise is often impeded by the de-
gree of dissimilarity between different legal systems. Without a com-
mon core of concepts, procedures, tools, and terms, useful, as opposed
to merely interesting, comparisons may be difficult to construct.
Because we share an English common law tradition, and a belief
in the use of law as a vehicle for social change, and - on a more
mundane level - because English is the working language of both
our legal systems, American and Indian lawyers, judges, and legal
scholars and civil rights activists have much we can learn from each
other about alternative solutions to a common set of juridical
problems. It is my earnest hope that this preliminary consideration
exploring the nature and functions of presumptions and burdens of
proof in American and Indian anti-subordination law, will serve to
advance that emerging dialogue.
94. Allen, "Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil Ac-
tions-An Anatomy of Unnecessary Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform," 72 North-
west U. L. Rev. 892 (1982).
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